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In order to keep this article within manageable limits both as to scope and length,
the writer makes the following assumptions and "ground rules."
So far as possible, the problems discussed will be limited to those which arise by
reason of the character of the security involved; a lender who relies upon literary
and artistic property as security will be confronted with many of the same problems
which face lenders in general or lenders secured by ordinary tangible property, but
this paper will concentrate upon the unique or at least special difficulties which face
lenders who depend upon the particular security herein discussed. It is assumed that
the relationship of the parties is simply borrower and lender, and that the security
consists solely of literary or artistic properties. The efficacy of devices to transform
the transaction into one other than a loan is not of concern. This paper will not
deal with loans secured by literary or artistic material which has become part of
other collateral; to some extent, for example, a lender secured by a motion picture
or an assignment of royalties of a published literary work must consider certain of
the problems presented below; nevertheless, there is excluded from consideration
situations in which tangible or other collateral constitutes the basic security.
Since this article deals primarily with security problems, it will not attempt to draw
distinctions between literary property on the one hand and artistic property on the
other. "Artistic properties" consist of such material as musical compositions, maps,
works of art and reproductions of works of art, drawings, photographs, pictorial il-
lustrations, designs, sketches, and dance routines. It is believed that from a security
aspect the important difference is between copyrighted material on the one hand
and uncopyrighted material on the other, and that the distinction between literary
and artistic property is not of real significance.
When discussing copyrighted material, it will be assumed that the copyright
proprietor has made the necessary applications to the Register of Copyrights of the
United States, has affixed the necessary notices, and has otherwise fulfilled the re-
quirements necessary to secure a valid United States copyright. Except where other-
wise noted, discussions of the problems relating to the hypothecation of copyright
will refer to the hypothecation of the entire copyright by the copyright proprietor.
Historically, literary and artistic properties had little economic significance and
were of dubious value as collateral. Consequently cases involving hypothecations
of this type of material are not numerous. There is still no established source of
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loans for this type of security, but with the development of the entertainment busi-
ness and in particular the coming of age of the motion picture and television in-
dustries, transactions in which literary material is the basis of a loan are becoming
more frequent. These transactions are now arising out of negotiations in which
a company desiring to produce a motion picture, a television production or a play,
requires funds in its early stages of production for preparatory work and has no
collateral to offer at that stage except its literary rights.
Finally, this article limits itself to a consideration of those problems which con-
front a lender making a loan after receiving competent legal advice; problems which
arise through faulty draftsmanship or which could have been avoided in the first
instance by the selection of the proper instruments, compliance with required for-
malities or the inclusion in the instruments of various safe-guarding provisions, will
not be dealt with here.
COPYRIGIHTED MATERIAL
A. Unpublished Works
Section 4 of the Copyright Act extends the privilege of copyright protection to
"all the writings of an author."' Any artistic or literary work which meets this
definition may be copyrighted under Section io of the Act by publication with
notice of copyright affixed to each copy of the work published or offered for sale in
the United States.2 Section 12 of the Act extends the privilege of copyright pro-
tection to works, copies of which are "not reproduced for sale," i.e., so-called un-
published works? But artistic and literary works which may be copyrighted as un-
published works include only the works enumerated in Section i2: lectures or similar
productions; dramatic, musical or dramatico-musical compositions; motion picture
photoplays; photographs; motion pictures other than photoplays; works of art; plastic
works; and drawings.4
The sections of the Copyright Act which deal with the mortgaging and assign-
ment of copyrights5 make no distinction between copyrights upon published and
those upon unpublished works. It would seem, therefore, that a copyright upon an
unpublished work may be transferred or hypothecated under the Copyright Act in
the same manner and to the same extent as a copyright upon a published work.
One problem must be kept in mind when drafting a mortgage of a copyright
.17 U. S. C. §4 (Supp. 1952).
'Id. §io.
'Id. §ra.
'HoR.AcF G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARy PROPERTY 98 (1944). Section 5 of the
Copyright Act (17 U. S. C. §5) (Supp. 1952) specifies 13 different classes of works for copyright registra-
tion purposes. Five classes are not eligible for copyright as unpublished works under Section 12 since
they are not enumerated in that section: books; periodicals; maps; reproductions of works of art; and
prints and pictorial illustrations. Section 5 provides that the classification of works made therein shall
not be held to limit the subject matter of copyright as defined in Section 4 of the Act. Accordingly,
it would follow that other kinds of artistic and literary works, not included within the classes enumerated
in Section 5, but which meet the definition of "writings of an author" and which are not expressly
enumerated in Section i2, also are not eligible for copyright as unpublished works.
1 17 U. S. C. §§28 and 30 (Supp. 1952).
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upon an unpublished work. Such a copyright may lose its validity upon publication
of the work.6 If the work is published in compliance with the rules governing the
securing of a copyright upon publication, continued copyright protection is assured;
if it is published without such compliance, the works falls into the public domain.7
What can the mortgagee do to prevent the copyright proprietor-mortgagor frompublishing the work without notice of copyright and thereby destroying the copy-
right? As a minimum precaution, the mortgage itself should contain a clear and
unequivocal covenant on the part of the mortgagor not to authorize or permit thepublication of the work without the consent of the mortgagee, or, at least, without
complying with the requirements of the Copyright Act for securing a copyright
upon published work. The effectiveness of such a clause, is, however, doubtful.
Section io provides that the first publication of a "work" with the "required"
notice secures the copyright; but it implies that a failure to affix the notice upon each
opy, later published "by authority of the copyright proprietor," will "forfeit" the
copyright. And so the cases have held.' In American Press Association v. DailyStory Publishing Company,' the licensee of a copyrighted story published the story
without affixing to the printed copies thereof the statutory notice of copyright, inbreach of an express provision contained in the agreement with the copyright pro-prietor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that pub-
lication of the story did not work a forfeiture or destruction of the copyright, on the
theory that performance by the licensee of its contractual obligation to affix the statu-
tory notice to all copies of the story published by it was a condition upon its license,
and that the licensee's wrongful conduct in violating this obligation should not be
visited upon the licensor. In such a case, it may properly be said that the publication
of the work is not "by authority of the copyright proprietor." But in Daly v. Wal-
rath,'° it was held that an author can destroy his licensee's common law rights by.
publication, regardless of the fact that this may render the author liable to his licensee
for damages for breach of contract.
It would appear that if the copyright mortgagor authorizes or gives his consent
to the publication of the work, such publication is "by authority of the copyright
proprietor," and if the publication is made without the statutory notice, forfeiture
of the copyright will result, notwithstanding a provision in the mortgage prohibiting
such publication. Nevertheless, since there is no case authority directly in point,
and since the copyright mortgagee would at least be left with a cause of action
against his mortgagor for breach of contract, the mortgage should contain a pro-
vision of the kind referred to above.
Patterson v. Century Productions, 93 F. 2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937).
'Ibid. See also: Lumiere v. Pathe Exchange, 275 Fed. 428 (2d Cir. 1921); Rosedale v. News Syn-dicate, 39 F. Supp. 357 (S. D. N. Y. 194).
'E.g., Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U. S. 265 (1903); Louis De Jonge v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 235 U. S.33 (I914); National Comics Publication v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F. 2d 594 (2d Cir. 194).S120 Fed. 766 (7th Cir. 1902).10 40 App. Div. 220, 57 N. Y. Supp. 1125 (2d Dep't 1899).
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B. General Comments
The first and most important decision which faces the lender is the selection of
the form of security instrument he will require of the borrower and the determina-
tion of what substantive provisions he can properly include therein. The only
sections of the Copyright Act which deal with the hypothecation of copyrights are
Sections 28 and 30.1 Section 28 provides that:
Copyright secured under this title or previous copyright laws of the United States may be
assigned, granted or mortgaged by an instrument in writing signed by the proprietor of
the copyright, or may be bequeathed by will.
Section 30 reads as follows:
Every assignment of copyright shall be recorded in the Copyright Office within three
calendar months after its execution in the United States or within six calendar months
after its execution without the limits of the United States, in default of which it shall be
void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration, without
notice, whose assignment has been duly recorded.
Although Section 30 refers to "assignment of copyright" and does not expressly men-
tion the word "mortgage," it seems clear that a copyright mortgage is subject to the
provisions of this section.' 2
Generally, lender's counsel must choose between a mortgage, a pledge, or a grant
or assignment which, though absolute on its face, is given to secure performance of
the debtor's obligations. Counsel can expect to find little assistance from cases
decided under the Copyright Act. Only two reported cases have been found in
which any issue relating to a copyright mortgage was involved.' Caution would
seem to dictate the use of an instrument which clearly and unequivocally purports
to be a mortgage rather than one which purports to be an agreement of pledge. 4
21 17 U. S. C. §§8 and 30 (Supp. 1952)-
"
5 In In re Leslie-Judge Company, 272 Fed. 886 (2d Cir. i92i), the court held in effect that a mort-
gage of copyrights was void as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the mortgagor since the mortgage,
apparently, had not been recorded in the Copyright Office. In Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U. S. 252
(1891) the United States Supreme Court interpreted an analogous section of the Patent Act as re-
quiring the recordation of patent mortgages. This section provided: "An assignment, grant or convey-
ance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration,
without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent Office within three months from the date thereof."
Construing this section, the Court pointed out that (p. 256): "An assignment of the entire patent .. may
be either absolute or by way of mortgage .. " The language of Section 30, itself, supports an interpre-
tation that the term "assignment" includes mortgages, as well as outright assignments. The section states
that an unrecorded assignment shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for val-
uable consideration, without notice, "whose assignment has been duly recorded," instead of "whose
assignment or mortgage has been duly recorded."
"In re Leslie-Judge Company, 272 Fed. 886 (2d Cir. 1921); Republic Pictures Corporation v.
Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles, 197 F. 2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952).
"' A pledge has been defined as a bailment of personal property to secure an obligation of the bailor.
JamEs L. BRowN, PaSoNAL PROsRxTY 560 (1936). The main distinction between a pledge and a chattel
mortgage is that in the case of a pledge possession of the security is delivered to the creditor. Ibid.
Although this distinction obviously tends to break down in the case of intangibles, the courts continue
to label as "pledges" many security transactions involving intangibles where only symbolic or ostensible
delivery of possession takes place. See Robbins, The Pledge as an Illinois Security Device, 31 CER.-KaNr
L. REv. 99 (1953); Note, Security Interests Under Pledge Agreements, 51 YALE L. J. 431 (1942).
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Use of the pledge device gives rise to a number of uncertainties and would seem to
afford no advantages. Although no cases have been found involving an attempted
pledge of copyright, at least two cases decided in the federal courts'6 reflect judicial
recognition that a patent is a proper subject for a pledge as well as for a mortgage.
The opinions in these cases, however, do not consider whether authority for the
pledge device is to be found in the Patent Act or in local state law. In view of the
fact that the Copyright Act specifically authorizes the mortgaging of copyrights but
is silent on the subject of pledges, there is some doubt whether authority for the
pledge device can be read into the Act. On the other hand, it seems reasonably
clear that Congressional silence on the subject is not to be taken as evidence of Con-
gressional intent to proscribe this form of hypothecation of copyrights. If it be held
that Congress has not legislated on the matter, expressly or sub silentio, it follows
that reference must be made to state law to determine the validity and effect of a
purported pledge of copyright. Such a reference would raise difficult questions of
choice of law,"6 and, in many instances, give rise to uncertainties as to the lender's
rights under the pledge instrument 7 Moreover, while compliance with the recorda-
tion provision of the Copyright Act probably would not be required to protect the
pledgees rights against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers if state law is
deemed controlling on the subject, proper respect for the uncertainties inherent in
the transaction would in any event compel the lender to record the pledge instrument
in the Copyright Office. Thus the main advantage of the pledge technique-the
elimination of the formalities required to validate a mortgage-would be lost."8
Nor does there appear to be any real advantage to the utilization of an absolute
assignment given in fact as security for a debt-even though its use is comparatively
widespread. Once it is established that the assignment is given as security-and this
fact may be established by parol evidence'--the courts will treat the assignment as
"
5 Westmoreland Specialty Co. v. Hogan, x67 Fed. 327 (3d Cir. 19o9); Western Battery & Supply
Co. v. Hazelett Storage Battery Co., 6i F. 2d 220 (8th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 6o8 (x933).
" See infra under Section C of this paper.
"'If state law governs, at least two questions must be resolved: (s) whether the governing juris-
diction recognizes an intangible such as a copyright as the proper subject of a pledge; and (2) what
formalities, if any, must be complied with, under that state's law, in order to meet the minimal require-
ments of "delivery of possession" of the copyright to the pledgee, or of notice to third parties of the
existence of the pledge. See: Robbins, The Pledge as an Illinois Security Device, 31 Cr.-KAENr L. Rey.
99 0953).
"
8 The lender might suffer an additional disadvantage in utilizing a security instrument which on its
face purports to be an agreement of pledge. In Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U. S. 252 (1890), the
United States Supreme Court held that a mortgagee of a patent, whose mortgage is duly recorded in
accordance with the Patent Act, is entitled to maintain an action for infringement of the patent; the
mortgagor has no standing to maintain such an action. The copyright mortgagee would seem to be
entitled to the benefit of this rule. See HoRcn G. BALL, THE LAW OP COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PRoPmtTY
552 (i944). But in Westmoreland Specialty Co. P. Hogan, and Western Battery & Supply Co. v.
Hazelett Storage Battery Co., supra note 15, it was held that the pledgor of a patent is entitled to sue
for infringements. Accordingly, a pledge, as distinguished from a mortgage, of a copyright might
preclude the lender from maintaining an action for infringement of the copyright without joining his
mortgagor in the action.
"
9 E.g., Paladini v. Durchman, 2x6 Cal. 212, 13 P. 2d 731 (932). See SAMUEL W. EAGER, THE
LAw OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES AND TRUST R FEIPTS, 35 (1941).
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a mortgage.o Foreclosure proceedings would then be required to eliminate the
mortgagor's right of redemption and the advantages of a completed irrevocable
transfer would disappear. Since a grant or assignment will not contain provisions
customarily found in well-drafted mortgages (such as provisions relating to the hold-
ing of public or private sales, waiver of notice of the holding of such sales, waiver
of right of redemption, and the like) many of the advantages which can be obtained
by use of the mortgage form would be lost.
One point should be emphasized at this juncture. If the litigation or dispute in-
volves the two original parties-the borrower and the lender-the form of the in-
strument probably does not make too great a difference. The courts, in the exercise
of their equitable powers, will generally enforce the agreement and the security
provisions thereof in accordance with the intent of the parties.2 ' Similarly, recorda-
tion is not a requirement as between the original parties.22 The real problem arises
when the lender is confronted with claims of a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer
for value.
C. Formal Requirements of Copyright Mortgages
As we have seen, the Copyright Act merely provides that a copyright "may" be
mortgaged by an instrument in writing signed by the copyright proprietor 3 Use of
the permissive "may" suggests that an oral mortgage would be valid between the
parties and those having notice.' But since recordation is a prerequisite to the
validity of a copyright mortgage as against subsequent bona fide purchasers and
mortgagees for value23 and since a mortgage must be in writing to be recorded, the
limited efficacy of a verbal mortgage is only of academic interest to the prudent
lender.
There are comprehensive statutes in every state which provide for the filing or
recording of personal property mortgages in local offices of record26 And statutes
"
0 E.g., Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U. S. 252 (i89o).
"' Glenn, The "Equitable Pledge," Creditors' Rights and the Chandler Act, 25 VA. L. REv. 422
(1939).
" An unrecorded copyright assignment is valid between the parties. Banks Law Publishing Co. v.
Lawyers' Cooperative Co., x69 Fed. 386 (2d Cir. I9O9). Likewise an unrecorded patent assignment
is valid between the parties. See, e.g., John Tuman & Sons, Inc. v. Basse, 113 F. 2d 928 (2d Cir. 1940).
23 17 U. S. C. §28 (Supp. 1952).
"' For the view that an oral assignment of copyright would probably be valid between the parties,
see ARrluR W. WErL, AmFRicAN COPYRIGHT LAW 545 (1917).
2 17 U. S. C. §30 (Supp. 1952).
20 1 LEONARD A. JONES, THE LAw OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES 319 (6th ed.,
Bowers, 1933). The object of these statutes is to provide a mode of giving notice to third parties of
the existence of the chattel mortgage and its lien in lieu of the delivery of possssion of the mortgaged
property to the mortgagee, which was the only means of accomplishing the same purpose at common
law. Ibid. The statutes generally provide that a mortgage of personal property shall be recorded in the
town or county of the mortgagor's residence. i id. at 320. In many state statutes it is provided that
if the mortgagor is a non-resident of the state the mortgage shall be recorded in the county or town in
which the property may be at the time the mortgage is executed. Ibid. Several state statutes provide that
a mortgage of personal property shall be recorded not only in the county in which the mortgagor resides,
but also in the county in which the property is located. Ibid. In other state statutes the mortgage need
only be recorded in the county in which the property is situated at the time the mortgage is made.
Ibid. As a prerequisite to recordation, local statutes generally require the mortgage to be acknowledged
or witnessed in a specified manner. i id. at 42o et seq.
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in many states prescribe in varying degrees of detail the form and mode of execu-
tion and other prerequisites to validity of such mortgages.27 To insure the validity
of his mortgage against the whole world, must the copyright mortgagee comply with
such local requirements, as well as the minimal requirements of the Copyright Act?
Although two commentators have answered this question in the affirmative,28 one
court has indicated that the mortgaging of copyrights is the exclusive concern of
federal law. In In re Leslie-Judge Company,2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that a mortgage purporting to cover intangibles, in-
cluding copyrights, was invalid as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the mortgagor,
since there was no local statute regulating intangibles, and "copyrights may be at once
excluded from consideration because they can be mortgaged only under the federal
copyright law." In view of the dearth of reported cases involving copyright mort-
gages, the law on this subject would appear to be far from settled. S
It seems probable, however, that if a copyright mortgage is recorded in accord-
ance with Section 30 of the Copyright Act, the validity of the mortgage will not be
effected by failure to comply with local recording or filing statutes. In providing a
mode of giving notice to third parties of the existence of copyright mortgages and
assignments, it would appear that Congress has preempted the field and superseded
state laws on the same subject.3 1 The fair implication of the language of Section
3o-that an assignment or mortgage of copyright shall be void as against subsequent
bona fide transferees for value unless recorded in accordance with the statute-is that
an assignment or mortgage recorded in compliance therewith shall be valid as against
such third parties. The conclusion that Congress has preempted the field with re-
spect to the subject of recordation would appear to be supported by cases decided
under the Federal Ship Mortgage Act. 2 Since its enactment in x85o, this Act has
contained provisions relating to the recordation of mortgages on "vessels of the
United States"3 3 similar to the recording provisions of the Copyright Act." In a long
27 id. at 66 et seq. A California statute provides that the mortgage must be clearly entitled on
its face, apart from and preceding all other terms, as a mortgage of crops and chattels, or either, as the
case may be. CAL. CIv. CODE §2956. In addition this statute prescribes the form in which the mort-
gage may substantially be made. Ibid. The statutory form contains the date of execution of the mort-
gage, the names of the mortgagor and mortgagee, description of the property mortgaged and the note
or debt secured thereby, and the mortgagor's signature. Ibid. The California Supreme Court has held
that the provisions of this statute must be strictly construed and that a mortgage which is not made in
accordance therewith is invalid as against third parties. Kahriman v. Jones, 203 Cal. 254, 263 Pac. 537
(1928).
"
8 ARTUiB NV. WEIL, AMEUCAN COPYRIGHT LAW 561 (1917); Freeman, The Copyright as Security,
12 J. B. A. KAN. 257, 258 (1942).
29.272 Fed. 886 (2d Cir. i92i).
"The statutes of the governing jurisdiction, i.e., the state to whose laws reference would be made
under the applicable rule of the conflict of laws, may not, as a matter of statutory construction, apply
to a mortgage of intangibles such as copyrights. The New York courts have held, for example, that
the New York statute which requires a mortgage of "goods and chattels" to be filed in local offices of
record, does not apply to a mortgage or assignment for security of an intangible and that therefore
such an instrument need not be filed or refiled as prescribed by the statute. See, e.g., Niles v. Mathusa,
162 N. Y. 596, 57 N. E. x84 (1900).
"' See Allen v. Riley, 203 U. S. 347 (19o6), discussed infra note 37.
3241 STAT. 000 (9o), 46 U. S. C. §§gr' et seq. (1946).
"
5The applicable provisions of the Ship Mortgage Act presently provide as follows: "No sale, con-
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line of cases, both federal and state courts uniformly have held that the recordation
provisions of the Ship Mortgage Act supersede and exclude all state laws providing
for the filing or recording of ship mortgages in local offices of record 3
Likewise, it would seem that if the copyright mortgage is in writing, and if it
is signed by the copyright proprietor, its validity will be sustained notwithstanding
non-compliance with local statutes prescribing the form and mode of execution of
chattel mortgages. Since Congress has legislated on the subject and has declared that
a copyright may be mortgaged in compliance with a few simple requirements as
to form "and execution, it appears reasonable to conclude that state statutes cannot
impose additional requirements. Cases decided under the Patent Act3 and the
Ship Mortgage Act"0 support this view.F
veyance, or mortgage which, at the time such sale, conveyance, or mortgage is made, includes a vessel
of the United States, or any portion thereof, as the whole or any part of the property sold, conveyed, or
mortgaged shall be valid, in respect to such vessel, against any person other than the grantor or mort-
gagor, his heir or devisee, and a person having actual notice thereof, until such bill of sale, conveyance,
or mortgage is recorded in the office of the collector of customs of the port of documentation of such
vessel, as provided in subdivision (b) of this section." 41 STAT. 1000 (1920), 46 U. S. C. §921(a)
(1946).
"E.g.: White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wall. 646 (U. S. z868); Aldrich v. Aetna Ins. Company, 8 Wall.
491 (U. S. 1869); Cunningham v. Tucker, 14 Fla. 251 (1873); Fleming v. Fire Ass'n, x47 Mich. 404
(907); Foster v. Chamberlain & Co., 41 Ala. 158 (1867); Wood v. Stockwell, 55 Me. 76 (1867);
Mitchell v. Steelman, 8 Cal. 363 (857); c1. Imperial Diesel Engine Co. v. Criscuolo, 32 Cal. App. 2d
244, 89 P. 2d 674 (939), cert. denied, 3o8 U. S. 6ao (1939), rehearing denied, 3o8 U. S. 639 (I939).
"
5In Welsbach Light Co. v. Cohn, i8s Fed. 122 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. i91o), plaintiff's standing to
maintain an action for patent infringement was contested by the defendant. Plaintiff's title to the patent
in question was based on a purported assignment from the former owner, a corporation. This assign-
ment was in writing signed by the assignor's president on behalf of assignor, and the president's signa-
ture had been acknowledged before a notary public. Defendant contended that the assignment was in-
valid since the acknowledgment was not in the form prescribed for corporate acknowledgments by the
laws of New York, the state in which the assignment presumably was executed. The relevant section
of the Patent Act then in effect provided that "every patent, or any interest therein, shall be assignable
in law by an instrument in writing ... and shall be acknowledged before any notary public .. " The
court rejected defendant's contention, stating (p. 127): "This [the Patent Act] is the statute upon which
the question of assignment must rest. Patents are creatures of the federal statute, and it is within the
province of Congress to provide the manner of their transfer."
0 In Shaw v. McCandless, 36 Miss. 296 (1858) the Mississippi Supreme Court sustained the validity
of a ship mortgage, which had been executed in the state of Louisiana, against the contention that under
Louisiana decisions mortgages on vessels were not valid unless made according to "the usage and laws
of commerce." The court held that even if the ship mortgage, which had been recorded in compliance
with federal requirements, had not been made in accordance with "the laws and usages of commerce"
as defined by the Louisiana courts, the mortgage nevertheless ivas valid since (p. 300) "when the
law of Louisiana authorizes mortages according to the laws and usages of commerce, and Congress
establishes the rule regulating the subject, that rule becomes the law of commerce in relation to the
subject; and if it authorizes the execution and registration of mortgages upon vessels, all mortgages
made and recorded according to the requirements of the Act must be valid." In The Gordon Campbell,
131 Fed. 963 (W. D. N. Y. 1904) the court held valid a ship mortgage which had been properly re-
corded in compliance with the Ship Mortgage Act, notwithstanding non-compliance with a local statute
which provided that a mortgage given to secure a note, which does not on its face show that it is
secured by a chattel mortgage, shall be absolutely void.
1
7 The enactment by Congress of Sections 28 and 30 of the Copyright Act probably has not de-
prived the states of the power to enact legislation on the subject of transfer or hypothecation of copy-
rights, provided that the matters regulated by such legislation do not fall within the ambit of Sections
28 and 3o. In Allen v. Riley, 203 U. S. 347 (19o6), the United States Supreme Court upheld a Kansas
statute which made it unlawful for any person to sell a patent right in any county in the state without
first filing with the county clerk authenicated copies of the letters patent together with an affidavit affirm-
ing the genuineness of the letters and the authority of the affiant to sell the patented right. Defendant
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Since, with the possible exception of In re Leslie-Judge Company, there appears
to be no case law directly in point, the cautious mortgagee would do well to insist
that his copyright mortgage be drafted, executed, and recorded in accordance with
local laws regulating the mortgaging of personal property, as well as with the re-
quirements of the Copyright Act. But to what jurisdiction should reference be
made? Here, lender's counsel is confronted with perplexing problems in the conflict
of laws. Cases decided in the various jurisdictions, and even within the same
jurisdiction, reflect a wide diversity of judicial opinion as to the proper rule of the
conflict of laws to be applied in choosing the state law which determines'the legal
effect and validity of mortgages of personal propertyY8 According to the Restate-
ment"9 the validity and effect of a chattel mortgage are determined by the law of
the state where the chattel is located at the time the mortgage is executed. Many
states, however, follow the rule that these matters are to be governed by the law
of the state in which the mortgage is executed.41 Since the rule of conflict of laws
of the forum is applied in determining the choice of law to govern a given situa-
tion,4 ' lender's counsel must first pick out the state in which it seems most likely
an action would be brought under the mortgage. In many instances the mortgagee
will be a corporate lender doing business throughout the country, and mortgagor
will be a producer who regularly commutes between New York, Hollywood,
Chicago, and London. Under such circumstances, counsel's choice of the "likely
forum" would hardly be reliable. Even after counsel makes his best guess as to the
jurisdiction in which suit probably would be brought, he may be confronted with
a further question. The jurisdiction selected as the "likely forum" may follow the
Restatement rule that the validity and effect of personal property mortgages are
determined by the law of the state where the property is located at the time the
mortgage is executed. But it is clear that a copyright is an intangible without a situs
in any particular jurisdiction; 42 hence the Restatement rule would not be applicable
to a copyright mortgage. What rule would the "likely forum" then apply to de-
termine the state law which governs such a mortgage? It is submitted that these
choice of law problems can probably be eliminated, or at least lessened, by inserting
in the mortgage a provision providing that the validity and effect of a copyright
mortgage is to be governed by the Copyright Act and the laws of a stated juris-
contended that the Kansas statute was invalid on the grounds that it infringed upon the exclusive
power of Congress over patents and conflicted with the provision of the Patent Act regulating assign-
ments of patents. The Court rejected these arguments, pointing out that in the interest of pro-
tecting its citizens from fraud Kansas has the right to legislate on this subject until Congress does so.
Said the Court (p. 357): "The mere provision in the Federal statute for an assignment and its record
as against subsequent purchasers, etc. is not such legislation as takes away the rights of the States to
legislate on the subject themselves in a manner neither inconsistent with nor opposed to the Federal
statute."
58Stumberg, Chattel Security Transactions and the Conflict of Laws, 27 IOWA L. Rnv. 528 (1942).
R' ESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §265 (1934).
'E.g., Kusser v. Sioux City Horse & Mule Co., x99 Iowa 200, 20o N. W. 404 (1922); Holt v.
Mahoney, 6o S. D. 158, 244 N. W. 98 (1932).
"RsTATaam,Nr, CONFLICT OF LAws §7 (934).
"Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. 448, 45X (U. S. 1854).
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diction.43 The copyright mortgage should then be prepared and recorded in accord-
ance with the laws of that jurisdiction which are applicable to personal property
mortgages in general.
It is appropriate, at this point, to call the reader's attention to a peculiarity in the
provisions of Section 30. Under most recordation statutes a purchaser or encum-
brancer is not concerned with claims which are recorded subsequent to his own.
Section 30, however, provides that a mortgage of copyright is void as against sub-
sequent purchasers or mortgagees, for valuable consideration, without notice, unless
recorded within ninety days after its execution. Thus, if the copyright proprietor
executed a mortgage to A on February I, and, without disclosing this fact, executed
another mortgage to B on February io, A's mortgage would have priority over
B's if recorded within ninety days from February i even though B's mortgage is
recorded first.m " B would be obliged to withhold payment of sums due the mort-
gagor, or to cause the same to be held in escrow, for a period of ninety days from
the date on which his mortgage was executed, in order to be certain that no
previously executed assignment or mortgage recorded within the ninety-day period
could obtain priority.
D. Substantive Provisions of the Copyright Mortgage
It is desirable for the protection of a mortgagee to include in the mortgage many
substantive provisions, especially those relating to rights upon default. Provisions
which give to the mortgagee upon default the power to sell the property at public
or private sale, waiver or curtailment of notice of such sale, waiver of the right of
redemption, confirmation of the right of the mortgagee to bid and purchase at the
foreclosure sale, and the right to foreclose separately or en masse if more than one
item of security is involved, are examples of the type of contractual protection mort-
gagees desire. A well-drafted mortgage should also secure future advances and
advances made for the protection, improvement or maintenance of the security; a
copyright mortgage should give the mortgagee a lien upon additional copyrights
secured upon different versions of the same work. As pointed out above, it may
also be important to insert restrictions upon publication by the mortgagor of the
copyrighted work and upon the uses which the mortgagor may make of the work.
It is apparent that these matters are not regulated under the Copyright Act. In
accordance with established principles, it seems that since Congress has not pre-
empted the field by statutory regulations of its own, these matters will be governed
by applicable local law.45 The draftsman may insert provisions of the kind described
above so long as such provisions are valid under the laws of the governing state
jurisdiction.
" See: Stumberg, Chattel Security Transactions and Conflket of Laws, 27 IowA. L. REv. 528, 534
(942).
"See Herbert A. HOWELL, THE CoP RiGir LAw 173 (1952).
"See Cookson v. Louis Marx & Co., 23 F. Supp. 615 (S. D. N. Y. 2938) (holding that the
question of capacity to make an assignment of patent is governed by the law of the state of assignor's
domicile); Radio Corporation of America v. Cable Radio Tube Corporation, 66 F. 2d 778 (2d Cir. 1933),
cert. denied, 290 U. S. 703 (1934) (holding that a parol license to sell patented articles for 4 years
was void under state statute of frauds).
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E. Enforcement of the Copyright Mortgage
One of the first questions which confronts a mortgagee who desires to foreclose
his copyright mortgage through judicial proceedings is the question of jurisdiction.
In 1952 the only reported case on the subject-Republic Pictures Corporation v.
Security First National Bank48.- was decided by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The facts of that case were as follows: In an earlier action the bank, a
California corporation, obtained a decree of foreclosure by default in the United
States District Court upon a copyright mortgage executed by mortgagor, a California
corporation. Since there was no diversity of citizenship, the jurisdiction of the Dis-
trict Court depended on whether the proceeding was an "... . action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents, copyrights or trade marks."47 The bank
instituted the instant action for declaratory relief against Republic Pictures Corpora-
tion, the distributor of the motion picture upon which the copyright was secured.
Republic contended that the decree of foreclosure in the earlier action was void since
the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case. The District Court, in the
2eclaratory relief action, rendered judgment for plaintiff Security Bank, holding
that the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to foreclose copyright mortgages.4"
This decision was reversed on appeal, the Court of Appeals holding that jurisdiction
in such cases was vested exclusively in the state courts. The bank did not petition
the Supreme Court to review this decision.
Consideration should be given to the possibility that the decision reached in the
Republic case will not be followed in other jurisdictions or may ultimately be over-
ruled by a decision of the United States Supreme Court in a similar case. A mort-
gagee obtaining a decree of foreclosure in a jurisdiction which ultimately follows
a rule contrary to the rule of the Republic case may be confronted with a claim
that his decree, and the tide acquired thereunder, are void and that any exercise of
dominion over the copyright constitutes a conversion. In order to minimize such
risks it is suggested that either one of two courses be followed: (a) the foreclosure
action should be instituted in the federal court if jurisdiction can be obtained upon
the grounds of diversity of citizenship; or (b) if no diversity exists, foreclosure of
the copyright mortgage should be accomplished by exercise of the power of sale in
the mortgage, and, if the lender is the purchaser at the sale, he should thereafter file
a quiet tide or declaratory relief action in the appropriate state court in order to
obtain judicial sanction for his tide.49 Even if it is later determined, in a subsequent
action, that the judgment rendered by the state court in the earlier quiet tide or
declaratory relief action was void for lack of jurisdiction, such a determination would
not invalidate the sale itself.
,o 197 F. 2d 767 (9th Cir. X952).
"728 U. S. C. A. 1338(a) (Supp. 1952).
"
8 Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles v. Republic Pictures Corporation, 97 F. Supp. 360
(S. D. Cal. I95i).
"If the state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to foreclose a mortgage of copyright, a lortiori they
have jurisdiction to entertain a suit to determine title to the copyright. See Luckett v. Delpark, 270
U. S. 496 (1926).
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F. Hypothecation of Less than the Entire Copyright
A comparatively frequent occurrence in transactions involving loans upon the
security of literary material arises out of the following circumstances: A writes and
becomes the copyright proprietor of a successful novel. A licenses unto B the entire
motion picture rights. B, while preparing for the production of the motion picture,
desires to borrow money to be secured by a mortgage on the motion picture rights
to the novel. Can a lien enforceable as against third parties be created by such a
mortgage?
Partial assignments or licenses, i.e., transfers of less than the entire copyright,
have long been recognized by the courts and other authorities,50 notwithstanding the
fact that Section 28 of the Copyright Act does not expressly authorize anything less
than a transfer of the whole copyright. The doctrine of "indivisibility of copyrights"
fias fallen into disrepute and in recent years has been limited by the courts to the
purely procedural question of whether a transferee of less than all of the rights
conferred by copyright is entitled to maintain an infringement action. 51 Accord-
ingly, it seems clear that there is nothing in the Copyright Act which bars or limits
a partial mortgage, i.e., mortgage of less than the entire copyright.
2
If the lender's rights under his partial mortgage are to be fully protected against
the whole world, the mortgage must be an instrument which Section 30 of the Act
requires to be recorded. Otherwise recordation of the mortgage will not constitute
constructive notice of the mortgage and its lien to subsequent transferees and en-
cumbrancers of the entire copyright or of the same rights;5 3 moreover, with respect
0 See: e.g., Herwig v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 384 (Ct. Cl. 1952); HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW
OF COPYRIGHT AND LITRARY PROPERTY 534 (1944).
"2 The theory that the Copyright Act recognizes only an all embracing indivisible copyright developed
in cases in which the courts were confronted with the question of whether a transferee of less than
the entire copyright is entided to maintain an action against infringers. Haunted by the specter of a
multiplicity of suits being brought against the infringer, the courts have held that the transferee may
not maintain such an action without joining the copyright proprietor. See: e.g., New Fiction Publishing
Co. v. Star Co., 22o Fed. 994 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); Goldwyn Pictures Corporation v. Howells Sales
Co., 282 Fed. 9 (2d Cir. 1922). The concept of the indivisibility of copyright was embodied in a ruling
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in I. T. 2735, XII-2 Cum. BuLL. 13 r (1933), in which the
Commissioner ruled that a copyright constituted a single unit of property and that any rights granted
thereunder by the author were merely licenses and that amounts paid for the rights granted constituted
royalites which were taxable as ordinary income. In recent cases the courts have rejected this view
and have held that a grant of one or more of the various rights enumerated in Section I of the Copy-
right Act constitutes a "sale' of personal property, and, if the other requirements imposed by the In-
ternal Revenue Code are met, the proceeds received by the "seller" will be taxable as long term capital
gain, rather than ordinary income. See: e.g!., Herwig v. United States, IO5 F. Supp. 384 (Ct. Cl.
1952).
" "Nothing in the law of copyrights bars or limits sale of any one of the numerous exclusive rights
conferred by the various subdivisions of §x [of the Copyright Act]. Congress has not disallowed such
sales and nothing in the due enforcement of the Copyright Law suggests their disallowance. Quite the
contrary. . . . The scheme and details of the copyright legislation manifest a separate treatment of the
various exclusive rights conferred by the statute. ... It segregates these rights into separately numbered
paragraphs. In each paragraph there is listed, in the alternative, a more detailed subdivision of the
various rights. Each of these rights is substantial and exists separately from the others, and has of
course been considered a property right." Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Commissioner v. Wodehouse,
337 U. S. 369, 420-422 (1949).
"' See Ho ,cE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LIERARY PROPERTY 449-550 (1944). It is
generally held that unless required by law the recordation of a document does not operate to give
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to the existence of prior mortgages on the same rights, our lender would not be
able to rely on his search of the records of the Copyright Office even though the
search disclosed that no prior mortgage on the same rights was of record. The un-
recorded mortgage, of which our lender presumably does not have actual notice,
being prior in time, probably would prevail. 4 If the mortgage of less than a whole
copyright is subject to the recordation requirements of the Copyright Act, it will be
void as against subsequent bona fidetransferees for value if not recorded within the
statutory period. But if such a mortgage is not subject to Section 30 of the Act,
failure to record would not, it would seem, invalidate the mortgage as to subsequent
transferees.
There is substantial case authority for the proposition that a license is void as
against a subsequent transferee of the copyright or the same rights, for value and
without actual notice of the prior license, unless the prior license is recorded in ac-
cordance with the recordation provisions of the Copyright Act. At least two cases
decided by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit so hold. 5 Although several
commentators56 on the law of copyright take the position that the Act does not
require the recordation of licenses and that, accordingly, recordation will not con-
stitute constructive notice to third parties of the existence of such licenses, the obvious
implication of these cases is to the contrary. It would appear, therefore, that the
licensee is protected both against prior transferees and subsequent transferees if there
is no prior transfer of record in the Copyright Office, and if in addition the licensee
records his license within the period allowed by the Copyright Act. And in these
respects there would seem to be no reason to treat a partial mortgage differently than
a license.
But one of the facts in our hypothetical situation requires special consideration.
It will be remembered that B, our borrower-mortgagor, is himself a licensee. Does
the fact that B is not the "copyright proprietor" change our conclusion as to the
validity and recordability of the partial mortgage? Here again the license cases
are helpful. The federal courts have long recognized the validity of licenses of
rights under a patent executed by individuals who themselves were licensees of the
constructive notice of its contents. E.g.: Rehm v. Reilly, 161 Wash. 418, 297 Pac. 147 (1931);
Kendrick v. Colyar, 143 Ala. 597, 42 So. 1io (1904); Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Cohen, 156 Md. 368,
144 Ad. 641 (1929).
"See Freeman, The Copyright as Security, 12 J. B. A. KAN. 257, 259 (1942).
" Photo Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 22o Fed. 448 (2d Cir. 1915); Brady
v. Reliance Motion Picture Corp., 229 Fed. 137 (2d Cir. 1916); cf. Macloon v. Vitagraph, 30 F. 2d
634 (2d Cir. 1929). The decision of the Second Circuit in Photo Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social
Uplift Film Corp., supra, has been criticized on the ground that the court erroneously considered the
instruments of transfer as assignments instead of licenses. Ax'RHu. \V. WEIL, AMmucAm COPYRIGHT LAw
562, 563 (19'7). However, in its opinion in the same case the District Court (Judge Learned Hand)
stated: "However, it is really not necessary to consider whether or not this is a license or an assignment,
because a license falls before an assignment taken in good faith anyway. It would be absurd to protect a
subsequent purchaser against a prior unrecorded assignee and leave him open to prior unrecorded licenses
which should defeat him." 2r3 Fed. 374, 377 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
G OARTHim W. WEm, AmEI)ICAN COPYRIGHT LAw 562-564 (1917); HoRAcE G. BALL, THE LAW oP
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 550 (1944).
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 267
same rights from the patent proprietor. 7 The only restriction imposed by the
courts is that the agreement between the patentee and the first licensee must ex-
pressly permit the further transfer of the rights involved.5"
In the light of these cases, the lender should make sure that the prior agreement
between his mortgagor and the copyright proprietor expressly permits the further
transfer of the same rights. If the original license agreement so provides, there
would seem to be no reason why the partial mortgage, if properly executed and re-
corded in accordance with the Copyright Act, would not be valid as against the
whole world.
Photo Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp. 9 is authority for
this view. In that case the author of a novel assigned his right to copyright the novel
to a publisher. The publisher secured copyright upon the novel and thereafter re-
assigned all dramatization rights, including motion picture rights, to the author.
The author then transferred the motion picture rights to one Totten. Totten did
not record his "assignment." Thereafter the author transferred the motion picture
rights in the novel to plaintiff, who duly recorded his "assignment." Plaintiff pro-
duced and copyrighted a motion picture based on the novel. Subsequently plaintiff
filed an action to restrain defendant, Totten's transferee, from producing and selling
motion pictures based on the novel. The District Court entered an order granting
plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. This order was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which held that plaintiff acquired the motion pic-
ture rights free and clear of Totten's unrecorded "assignment." Although it is clear
that the author was nothing more than a licensee, i.e., a transferee of less than the
entire copyright, that fact did not affect the determination that the transfer to Totten
was subject to the recordation requirements of the Copyright Act.
G. The Copyright Renewal Problem
Before bringing our discussion of copyrighted material to a close, a brief reference
to the problems presented by the copyright renewal statute is necessary. Section
24 of the Copyright Act60 provides that a copyright shall endure for a period of
&2 ,VALKER ON PATENTS §388 (Deller's ed. X937).
" E.g., Karl Kiefer Mach. Co. v. U. S. Bottlers Machinery Co., 114 F. 2d 169 (7th Cir. 1940).
ts 22o Fed. 448 (2d Cir. 1914).
00 17 U. S. C. §24 (Supp. x952). This Section provides that: "The copyright secured by this title
shall endure for twenty-eight years from the date of first publication, whether the copyrighted work
bears the author's true name or is published anonymously or under an assumed name: Provided, That
in the case of any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopedic, or other composite work upon
which the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor thereof, or of any work copyrighted by
a corporate body (otherwise than as assignee or licensee of the individual author) or by an employer
for whom such work is made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal
and extension of the copyright in such work for the further term of twenty-eight years when application
for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly registered therein
within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright: And provided further, That in
the case of any other copyrighted work, including a contribution by an individual author to a periodical
or to a cyclopedic or other composite work, the author of such work, if still living, or the widow,
widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such autho, widow, widower, or
children be not living, then the author's executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kbn
shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of
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twenty-eight years from the date of first publication and may be renewed for an
additional twenty-eight years by an application filed in the Copyright Office in the
twenty-eighth year of the original term by the person entitled to the renewal.
The first point which the lender-should keep in mind is that the people who may
obtain the renewal are specifically enumerated in the Act and are more limited in
number than those who may take out first rights. With respect to most copyrighted
works, only the author, if alive at the time of renewal, is entitled to renew the copy-
right term, even though he may not be the proprietor of the original copyright. In
the case of any "posthumous work" or "other composite work" or of any work "copy-
righted by a corporate body (otherwise than as assignee or licensee of the individual
author) or by an employer for whom such work is made for hire," the copyright
proprietor, who is not the author of the work, is entitled to the renewal."' Thus, to
keep his security interest alive during the renewed term, the lender must make sure
that his mortgage on the renewal copyright is executed by the person entitled to the
renewal. Where the copyright proprietor is not within the class of persons expressly
designated by the statute as being entitled to a renewal, the lender may need two
mortgages: one mortgage covering the original copyright executed by the copyright
proprietor; and a second mortgage hypothecating the renewal copyright executed by
the author or other person entitled thereto.
The second point to consider is that the renewal, when secured, is free and clear
of any right, interest or license granted under the original copyright.0 2 It is well
settled, however, that prior to the renewal period an author may assign his ex-
pectancy of the renewal right, but that the effectiveness of the assignment depends
upon the survival of the author to the renewal period.0 3  If the author dies prior
to the renewal period, i.e., prior to the first day of the twenty-eight year of the
original term, the assignment is a nullity. 4 It would appear, on the authority of the
assignment cases, that an author may, prior to the renewal period, also hypothecate
his expectancy of the renewal right, and that such hypothecation will become effective
if the author is alive on the first day of the twenty-eighth year. Accordingly, in any
case in which the copyright proprietor is one of the persons entitled to a renewal,
the lender should make certain that his mortgage contains clear and unequivocal
language hypothecating the renewal right.
But, the lender should bear in mind that if the author dies prior to the renewal
period, the author's right of renewal passes under the statute to his widow, children,
twenty-eight years when application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copy-
right office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of
copyright: And provided further, That in default of the registration of such application for renewal
and extension, the copyright in any work shall determine at the expiration of twenty-eight years from
first publication."
"See discussion in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F. 2d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 194i).2 E.g., Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314 (S. D. N. Y. 1937); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount
Pictures, x89 F. 2d 469 (2d Cir. 195i).
"M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F. ad 949 (2d Cir. 1942), aLl'd, 318 U. S.
643 (1943).
0 ibid.
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executor or next of kin. If the author dies prior to the first day of the twenty-eighth
year, the prior assignment of his expectancy of renewal does not cut off the rights
of renewal extended by the statute to his widow, children, executor or next of kin.65
Thus, even if the mortgage expressly covers the author's right of renewal, the death
of the author prior to the renewal period will render the mortgage a nullity-as far
as the renewal copyright is concerned. To be fully protected against this con-
tingency, the lender would have to obtain a separate mortgage or assignment from
the author's potential successor. This presents a considerable problem. It would
be most difficult to foretell which persons-widow, children, executor or next of
kin-will succeed to the renewal rights upon the death of the author, particularly
where the author is a relatively young man and the original copyright term still
has many years to run. As a practical matter, the need to obtain a lien on the re-
newal copyright becomes urgent only if the original copyright has but a short time
left to run. Under such circumstances, the lender may find himself faced with the
problem of securing mortgages or assignments from a number of persons other than
the copyright proprietor 6
UNCOPYRIGHTED MATERIAL
For the purposes of this discussion, the term "uncopyrighted material" refers to
any original literary or artistic work which has not been copyrighted under the
federal copyright statute, and which has not been dedicated to the public as a result
of publication of the work or abandonment of the rights therein. Historically, the
phrase "common law copyright" has been used to designate the bundle of rights
conferred at common law on the owner of such a workY7 Since a common law copy-
right is lost by publication, the essential common law rights conferred on the owner
of an uncopyrighted work are the exclusive right to make first publication of the
work and the correlative right to prevent or limit publication.68
To begin with, our lender, who desires to make a loan on the security of un-
copyrighted material, is faced with the practical problem of making an independent
determination as to whether his prospective lien on the work would be subject to any
prior transfers or liens. In the case of copyrighted material, the prospective lender
may search the records in the copyright office and if he finds no record of a prior
transfer or hypothecation he is reasonably assured that his mortgage, if duly recorded
in accordance with Section 30 of the Copyright Act, will have priority over the
claims of any prior assignee or encumbrancerP 9 In the case of uncopyrighted matter,
no comparable precaution can be taken. A search of the official records of every
Or Ibid.
"6 For a discussion of this problem, see Selwyn & Co. v. Veiller, 43 F. Supp. 49r, 494 (S. D. N. Y.
1942).
6?COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PRoPERTY, 18 C. J. S. 133, 138 (§i et seq.) (1939).
as Ibid.
" As has already been pointed out, the lender runs the risk that a previously executed mortgage or
assignment may be recorded after the lender's mortgage is recorded but within ninety days from the
date of its execution, in which event it would prevail over the lender's mortgage. See supra, page
263.
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county or city wherein a prior transaction involving the work might have been con-
summated obviously would not be feasible. Even if such a comprehensive search
could be made, it would be of little value, since it is unlikely that any state requires
the recordation of assignments or licenses of uncopyrighted material and it is doubt-
ful if many states require the recordation of instruments creating liens upon such
property. In the last analysis, the prospective lender must rely on the good faith
of the borrower and on the ingenuity of his counsel in verifying the borrower's
representations.
To determine whether a common law copyright may validly be hypothecated,
and, if it may, the kind of security device which should be utilized in effecting such
hypothecation, lender's counsel must, of course, look to the laws of the governing
state jurisdiction. It is not within the scope of this paper to summarize or attempt
to summarize the applicable statutory and case law of each of the forty-eight states.
At best, the writer can merely point up the kind of problems which lender's counsel
can expect to encounter. At the outset, counsel is confronted with the same difficult
questions of choice of law, to which reference has already been made in our dis-
cussion of copyrighted material. 70
If the statutes of the governing jurisdiction which regulate the form and re-
cordation of personal property mortgages are broad enough to authorize and regu-
late the mortgaging of intangibles such as common law copyrights, the problems
are greatly simplified. The lender's security interest will be protected against sub-
sequent transferees and creditors by a mortgage prepared, executed, and recorded
in accordance with these statutes. 71 Moreover, compliance with the local statutes will
eliminate the risk that at some later date a court may decide that the statutory re-
quirements extend to other forms of security instruments or that a particular security
instrument constitued, in effect, an attempted mortgage which was rendered in-
valid by non-compliance with the mortgage statutes.
The state personal property mortgage statutes may not, however, be applicable to
mortgages of intangibles, such as common law copyrights. The New York Lien
Law,72 for example, provides that every mortgage of "goods and chattels" and
certain canal craft shall be absolutely void as against creditors of the mortgagor and
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith and for a fair consideration
unless recorded and re-recorded in accordance with the applicable statutory pro-
visions. The New York courts have held that this recording statute does not apply
to mortgages on personal property generally, but only to mortgages on personal
property which meets the definition of "goods and chattels.""8 Thus, it has been
held that an instrument effecting the hypothecation of an intangible such as a claim
71 See pages 262-263 supra.
"' See i LEONARD JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES 379 et seq. (6th ed., Bowers
1933).
'
72 N. Y. LIEN LAW §230 et seq. (1940).
"
1 E.g., Niles v. Mathusa, 162 N. Y. 596, 57 N. E. 184 (1900).
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or demand, 74 accounts receivable, 75 a mortgage78 or a liquor tax certificate,77 is not
subject to the recordation requirements of the Lien Law. Moreover, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated in one case that there is
no New York statute regulating the mortgaging of intangibles such as good will
and trade-marks.7 s
If there is no local statute regulating the mortgaging of common law copyrights,
recourse must be had to the decisional law of the state to determine whether such
a mortgage will stand up against creditors of the mortgagor and subsequent trans-
ferees. If counsel finds no reliable case authority for the mortgage device, he may
find authority in analogous cases for the hypothecation of such property by a security
assignment or pledge. In New York, the courts have upheld security assignments
of various intangibles. In Harrison v. Burlingame,9 it was held that the rights
acquired by a lender under a security assignment of a mortgage were superior to
those of a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the mortgage for value. In Niles v.
Mathusa,s° the New York Court of Appeals held valid, as against the claims of a
subsequent judgment creditor, an assignment of a liquor tax certificate given to
secure a loan. And the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, apply-
ing New York law, held in Rockmore v. Lehman"1 that a security assignment of
moneys due under a contract was valid as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the
assignor. The Illinois courts have upheld, as against the claims of third parties,
pledges of such intangibles as a conditional vendor's interest under a conditional sales
contract,8 2 a judgment lien,"3 an interest in a partnership, 4 moneys due under a
lease,"' and a seat on a livestock exchange8 6
Thus, in those jurisdictions in which there is no statutory or case authority for
a mortgage of the common law rights in uncopyrighted material, lender's counsel
may find case authority for the hypothecation of the property by means of some other
security device. In such a jurisdiction, counsel should cast his security instrument
in the form approved by the courts in analogous cases.
Since a large number of security transactions of the kind discussed in this paper
are consummated in California, it may be profitable to consider some of the problems
presented by the unique statutes of that state.
A California statute provides that:87
"Hammond v. Carthage Sulphite Pulp & Paper Co., 8 F. 2d 35 (2d Cir. 1925).
"In re Hub Carpet Co., 282 Fed. 12 (2d Cir. 1922).
"0 Harrison v. Burlingame, 48 Hun 212 (N. Y. a888).
17 Niles v. Mathusa, supra, note 73.
"hIn re Leslie Judge Company, supra, note 29.
71 Note 76, supra.
" Note 73, supra.
61 129 F. 2d 892 (2d Cir. 1942).
"2 Chapin v. Tampoorlos, 325 Ill. App. 219, 59 N. E. 2d 545 (r945).
B' owles v. Seymour, 184 Il1. App. 240 (1913).
s, Home State Bank v. Vandolah, i88 Ill. App. 123 (r914).
B Ross v. Skinner, 107 Ill. App. 579 (1903).
'o Press Co. v. Fahy, 313 I1. 262, 142 N. E. 103 (1924).
8
"CAL. CIv. CODE §2955 (99).
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Mortgages may be made upon . . . any and all kinds of personal property except
• . . personal property not capable of manual delivery.
While a mortgage of property "not capable of manual delivery" probably is valid
between the parties and persons having actual notice thereof,"' such a mortgage
would seem to be invalid as against subsequent bona fide transferees for value and
attaching creditors of the mortgagor. The recent case of In re Quaker Room 8
involved an attempt by the owner of a California on-sale liquor license to mortgage
it as security for a loan. In a proceeding brought by the trustee in bankruptcy of
the "mortgagor" for an order directing the "mortgagee" to turn over the license
to the bankrupt estate, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California held that the mortgage may, under California law, be avoided by attach-
ing creditors of the mortgagor, and, therefore, by the trustee in bankruptcy, since
a California on-sale liquor license is a species of property "not capable of manual
delivery."
A common law copyright obviously falls within the category of "personal prop-
erty not capable of manual delivery." Thus, under California law, an instrument
which on its face clearly and unequivocally purports to mortgage the common law
rights in an uncopyrighted work undoubtedly would be invalid as against subse-
quent bona fide transferees for value and attaching creditors of the putative mort-
gagor. The statutory prohibition against mortgages of "personal property not
capable of manual delivery" does not mean, however, that under California law per-
sonal property within this category may not, as against subsequent transferees and
creditors, be validly hypothecated by some other security device. In Joint Pole
Association v. Steele," the California Supreme Court held that an assignment of
money to be paid under a contract, given for security, created a pledge which was
good as against an execution creditor of the pledgor, although concededly it did not
meet the requirements of the law as to chattel mortgages.
When the result in the Quaker Room case is compared with that in the joint
Pole case, the importance which California law seemingly attaches to the form
of the security instrument becomes evident. It is submitted that the attempted
hypothecation of the liquor license in the Quaker Room case might well have been
upheld had the security document in that case been cast in the form of an agreement
of pledge instead of a mortgage '
88 Id. §2973.
s9o F. Supp. 758 (S. D. Cal. i95o).
go 213 Cal. 233, 2 P. 2d 335 (x93i).
" Notwithstanding the fact that the security document in the joint Pole case apparently was in the
form of an outright assignment, it would seem advisable, if California law governs the transaction, to
draft the security instrument in the form of an express agreement of pledge instead of an assignment.
This would eliminate the risk that at some future date a court, subjected to conflicting oral evidence
as to the nature of the transaction, might hold that the assignment constituted an attempted mortgage
of "personal property not capable of manual delivery" and therefore is invalid as against a subsequent
transferee or creditor. See, e.g., Stewart v. Leasure, 12 Cal. App. 2d 652, 55 P. 2d 917 (1936), in which
it was held that a lien on property belonging to a lessee, which was created by a clause in a lease,
was subject to a subsequent mortgage on the same property, since the lease was not executed or recorded
i accordance with the statutes governing chattel mortgages.
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The use of the pledge device to effect hypothecation of a common law copyright
raises a further question. Because of judicial preoccupation with the requirement
that possession of the pledged property be delivered to, and retained by, the pledgee,
so as to give notice to third parties of the existence of the lien, the early cases seem
to have held that only tangible personal property might be made the subject of a
pledgeY2 It can no longer be doubted, however, that many kinds of intangibles may
be pledged. 3  In the case of a chose in action represented by an "indispensable
instrument," such as a bank deposit passbook, stock certificate or life insurance
policy, the change of possession requirement is met by manual delivery of the "in-
dispensable instrument!" to the pledgeeY4 However, where the intangible is not
represented by an indispensable instrument, only minimal formalities are necessary
to constitute delivery of possession. Ordinarily the execution and delivery of an as-
signment or other writing will constitute all the delivery and change of possession
that can be made in the case of such an intangible. 5 But must additional formalities
be complied with to satisfy the possession or notice requirement in the case of a
pledge of an uncopyrighted work? To protect his security interest as against sub-
sequent transferees or creditors, should the pledgee-lender require the pledgor
to deliver to him the original manuscript or a copy thereof? It can hardly be said
that the basiccommon law rights in the work, i., the right of first publication and
the right to withhold or limit publication, are "represented" by the manuscript. Ac-
cordingly, it would seem that if the governing jurisdiction recognizes a pledge of
a common law copyright, the pledge can be effected merely by the execution and
delivery of an appropriate agreement or assignment.
The pledgee or mortgagee of a common law copyright, like the mortgagee of a
copyrighted unpublished work, is faced with the possibility of an unauthorized pub-
lication by the pledgor or mortgagor which might constitute a dedication of the
work to the public and thereby render the security valueless. This problem has
already been discussed and the discussion need not be repeated hereY8 Suffice it to
say that as a minimum precaution the lender should insist upon the inclusion in the
mortgage or pledge agreement of a provision prohibiting or limiting the mortgagor's
or pledgor's right to publish the work.
CONCLUSION
It is manifest that the problems which confront the lender who undertakes to
lend money on the security of literary or artistic property are many and the answers
few. The dearth of reported cases on the subject makes counsel's job exceedingly
difficult in this field. Perhaps, however, many of the difficulties stem from the ab-
stract character of this kind of property. Justice Holmes once said :°
"RAY A. BRowN, A TAar~xsE oN THE LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 56o et seq. (1936).
" ibid. See, also, cases cited in notes 83 through 86, supra.
"Note, Security Interests Under Pledge Agreements, 51 YALE L. J. 431 , 436-437 (1942).
" E.g., Joint Pole Association v. Steele, supra, note go.
"8 See supra, pages 255-256.
'White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. i, xg (igo8).
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But in copyright property has reached a more abstract expression. The right to exclude
is not directed to an object in possession or owned, but is in vacuo, so to speak. It re-
strains the spontaneity of men where but for it there would be nothing of any kind to
hinder their doing as they saw fit. It is a prohibition of conduct remote from the persons
or tangibles of the party having the right. It may be infringed a thousand miles from the
owner and without his ever becoming aware of the wrong.
It is not surprising that, as collateral, copyright-the right to restrain "the spontaneity
of men"-does not fit conventional notions developed in the law of security.
